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In this paper we explore the 
usage of information communication 
technologies (ICTs) in the 
proliferation of non-state political 
violence, and governmental 
countermeasures to thwart such 
actions. We are specifically interested 
in gauging how communication 
technologies are being adapted to 
provide such non-state with new 
terrorist repertoires. To explore this 
issue, we utilize personal interviews 
with members of the U.S. government 





In 1993, when the World Trade 
Center was bombed, there were 130 
websites (Irving 1998; Surratt 2001; 
Smithsonian 2003). 1 By September 2001, 
there were well in excess of a billion, 
with an estimated seven million pages 
being uploaded daily (Castells 2001; 
Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000).  In 1993, 
22 articles about the Internet appeared in 
the New York Times (New York Times, 
                                                          
1 There were 130 websites in June 1993 (Surratt 
2001; Irving 1998).  There are no available 
statistics for February 1993. By the end of 1993, 
there were 623 websites (Irving 1998; 
Smithsonian 2003).  
1994).2 In 2001, between October and 
December alone, better than 760 Internet 
stories were deemed “all the news that’s 
fit to print” (New York Times, 2002). In 
1993, some 13 million Americans had 
cell phones, by 2001 there were 180 
million subscribers (McFarland 2002; 
Tesar 1983.) Today, American electoral 
politics is online, with candidates for 
county commissioner to the Presidency 
advertising via glossy websites (Bonchek 
1997; Davis 1999; Anderson and 
Cornfield 2003; Levine 2003; Norris 
2001; Rash 1997).  Moreover, economics 
has gone digital, with U.S. online retail 
spending, e-commerce, worth forty-five 
billion dollars in 2002, and high-tech 
industries driving about one-quarter of all 
economic growth.3 These figures reveal 
an incredible technological and 
behavioral phenomenon. Information 
communication technologies (ICTs) are 
therefore “the instruments with which 
and the conditions within which we enact 
some of the most profound conduct of 
lives” (Fischer 1992, 7). By any measure, 
computer-mediated communication 
(CMC) and “new” ICTs are embedded 
within the fabric of daily life — the way 
we shop, do business, obtain information, 
and communicate with others. These new 
technological appliances, or more 
precisely their usage, have changed 
society.   
Clearly, “[s]cience and 
technology have made enormous 
progress, but human nature, alas has not 
changed” (Laqueur 1999, 4). Thus, while 
ICTs are applied for positive goals, such 
as maintaining social relationships across 
                                                          
2 In 1992, there were only two stories about the 
Internet in the New York Times (See New York 
Times Index, vol.80). 
3 The figure of $45 billion does not include online 
travel or other ticket sales, nor monies spent 
through online brokerages (Regan 2003).   
  
vast distances, they have a darker side, 
where their adaptation has met the 
sinister needs of our human nature, such 
as crime,4 and as discussed in this paper, 
terrorist violence by non-state political 
actors. “The idea of terrorists 
surreptiously hacking into a computer 
system to introduce a virus, steal 
sensitive information, deface or swamp a 
web site, or turn off a crucial public 
service seriously concerns security 
personnel around the world” (Zanini and 
Edwards 2001, 29; see also Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt 2001).   
Utilizing personal interviews of 
members of the U.S. government and 
Washington’s IT security community, 
this paper examines the adoption and 
adaptation of ICTs in the proliferation of 
non-state political violence and the 
governmental countermeasures to thwart 
such actions. First, we specifically gauge 
how communication technologies are 
being adapted to provide non-state actors 
with new terrorist repertoires (Tarrow 
1998).  Here, accepting Enders and 
Sandler’s (2002) definition of terrorism, 
we examine how ICT repertoires emerge 
and spread, concluding that the usage of 
“traditional” ICTs, technologies which 
have achieved critical mass, dominate the 
terrorist’s ICT toolbox and are utilized to 
meet organizational needs (Morris and 
Ogan 1996; Tarrow 1998; Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt 2001). Second, recognizing that 
terrorism does not occur in a vacuum, we 
explore the counterterrorism measures 
being employed by the U.S. government 
to fight non-state political violence, 
finding that new countermeasures by 
                                                          
4 For example, since 2003, credit card fraud and 
identity theft, have been among America’s fastest 
growing crimes.  For example, 43% of fraud 
cases filed with the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) were identity theft complaints, making it 
the number one complaint in 2002 (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2003). 
governments are, in part, dependent on 
the availability of new technologies.  
Moreover, we find a commitment to a 
macro-level approach to adopting passive 
countermeasures, in order to combat the 
organizational functions ICTs perform 
for nonstate terrorists, while avoiding the 
pitfalls of piecemeal policy efforts of the 
past in the physical prevention of terrorist 
entering the United States (see Enders 




“Mr. President, we are under attack”  
Andrew Card, Chief of Staff to President 
George W. Bush, September 11th, 2001.  
 
On September 11th, 2001, eight 
times as many people died in the space of 
an hour to transnational terrorism than 
during an average year (see Enders and 
Sanders 2002, 145). Today, transnational 
terrorism –“when an incident is planned 
in one country but executed in another”- 
provides a threat to U.S. democracy and 
our domestic tranquility, even though 
historically such terrorism has only 
directly affected relatively few people 
(Laqueur 1999, 4). The atrocities of 9-11 
shocked Americans and have engaged the 
American government in the largest 
national security initiative since World 
War II.    
Terrorism is not easy to define.  
In this paper, however, we accept Ender’s 
and Sandler’s (2002) definition of 
terrorism. “Terrorism is the premeditated 
use or threat of extra normal violence or 
brutality by sub national groups to obtain 
a political, religious, or ideological 
objective through intimidation of a huge 
audience, usually not directly with the 
policy making that the terrorists seek to 
influence” (2002 146). This definition 
has broad applicability, and allows for 
  
variations in the scope of repertoires and 
organization of terrorist entities- state and 
nonstate actors. In policymaking circles, 
where all politics is local, definitions of 
terrorism embody patriotism.  
 
 
“Ah, I think the more you look at 
terrorism, and try and understand the 
problem of terrorism, the more you 
realize, ah, its, politics, politics is always 
going to play a role in the definition of 
terrorism. …Senator Graham has 
generally tried to take a more pragmatic 
approach, umm, and just identify, is this 
group that wants to harm Americans? 
And ah, if it is, them, ah, we should treat 
them as terrorists” (Dickas, 2004). 
 
 
While these two definitions differ in 
application and understanding, the two 
are equally salient, illustrating academic 
and policymaking realities.   
There are three main precepts in 
the identification and classification of a 
terrorist act. A terrorist action has three 
elements to it — target, devastation goal, 
and tool (For examples of earlier 
typologies see Drake 1998). Targets can 
vary from civilian institutions (shopping 
malls) and transportation (airplanes and 
ocean liners), to military installations and 
armaments (ships and aircraft) (Laqueur 
1999; Stern 1999). The terrorist’s tool of 
choice can vary too, from small 
explosives to civilian airliners used as 
flying bombs. Devastation goal refers to 
the level and significance of damage, 
whether physical or psychological, that a 
terrorist group seeks in their actions 
(Reich 1990; Crenshaw 2000). In this 
paper we focus on the latter — the tool 
— notably the usage of information 
technology, and especially ICTs that have 
achieved critical mass.   
Historically, terrorism has been 
used as the tool of separatists, zealots, 
and patriots in an ultimate attempt to 
spawn social change, political upheaval, 
and revolution. Acts of violence by non-
state actors pre-dates thee 14th century; it 
is not until the late 18th century that the 
word “terrorism” is spawned. The trouble 
with terrorism is not that it has always 
been indefensible but that it has been 
chosen more often than not as the prima 
ratio of self-appointed saviors of freedom 
and justice, of fanatics and madmen, not 
as the ultimate ratio of rebels against real 
tyranny (Laqueur 1999, 10).  
The word terrorism originated in 
1795, in connection with the French 
revolutionaries who executed their 
enemies and surpressed opposition with 
the guillotine (Crenshaw 1990, 10). The 
concept of terrorism took greater hold 
during the 1870s in Russia, when 
revolutionaries began to practise it. It was 
a means for weaker or smaller forces, 
without the financial means or military 
strength of larger countries, to wage war, 
essentially the only option for those 
unable to fight an orthodox struggle. 
Soon, the tactic spread to the 
Macedonians and Armenians of the 
Ottoman Empire, the Irish and the 
Indians in the British Empire, and 
separatists in America and Europe 
(Enders and Sanders 1993). In the 
twentieth century, terrorism would come 
from both sides of the political spectrum, 
first from the left and then in the mid 
1970s and later, from the right, most 
notably in Europe. Terrorism, a nuisance 
to the many, has had a long history 
(Laqueur 1999, 4-5). Biblical martyrs, 
Roman dissidents, French 
révolutionnaire’s, and English turncoats 
all serve to establish the history of 
terrorism. Thus, while we do not compare 
the acts of Al Qaeda and the like to the 
  
American founders, the principle and the 
three elements remain comparable. 
Terrorism has overthrown dictators, 
toppled monarchs, and dispelled tyrants 
throughout the ages, and will continue to 
serve those who seek its ubiquitous 
assistance.  
Understanding terrorism generally 
is impossible if the logic behind the 
decision to commit acts of terror is 
unapparent. Terrorists are rational actors 
(Crenshaw 1990: 2000; Zanini and 
Edwards, 2001). The actions of terrorists 
serve as the avenues of communication, 
and are generally motivated by a desire to 
gain public attention and media coverage. 
Most often than not terrorist actors feel 
that all areas of communication and 
compromise are exhausted. Terrorism is 
seen, therefore, as the best, if not the 
only, avenue open to them. 
Terrorism may in fact follow 
logical processes that can be discovered 
and explained. For the purpose of 
presenting this source of terrorist 
behavior, rather than the psychological 
one, it interprets the resort to violence as 
a willful choice made by an organization 
for political and strategic reasons, rather 
than as the unintended outcome of 
psychological or social factors (Crenshaw 
2000, 7-8). It is important to recognize 
the political psychology behind terrorist 
actions since it enables one to fully 
analyze terrorist action and determine 
why the act was committed, by whom, 
and what future action may be expected.   
So what is the current state of 
affairs? The War on Terror that began 
when America was attacked, has 
involved billions of dollars in America 
alone, and defense spending is still on the 
rise. The creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 
represented one of the largest 
governmental restructuring in history.  
With its broad executive power, and an 
enormous annual budget, the DHS serves 
as the supreme authority in domestic 
protection. Post 9/11 the real question in 
the back of the minds of Americans is 
very simple; “Is America safer today than 
it was on September 10, 2001?”   
This, like defining terrorism, is 
not easily answered. John Dickas (2004), 
head of terrorism for former Senator Bob 
Graham of Florida spoke to this;  
 
 
Ah, [pause], No. Well, [pause] I think in 
terms of, I don’t think the threat is 
diminished, I think, we have improved 
our security precautions in a lot of ways, 
especially aviation security. 
 
 
Speaking from a policymaking and 
political standpoint, many see homeland 
security as a multi dimensional, multi-
faceted operation, where large targets are 
emphasized, and security is maintained in 
the public domain. While certain 
potential areas of terrorist penetration 
have become much more secure; 
aviation, immigration, and event security, 
plenty of areas of weakness can be found.   
If we are to learn anything from 
the September 11 attacks it is that 
terrorist groups use well planned and 
unsuspecting means to launch their large 
scale attacks. The necessity of media 
coverage coupled with the media and 
public’s tendency to become inured to a 
certain level of death and destruction 
motivates terrorist organizations to be 
innovative and to collaborate with other 
groups to learn and develop new ways to 
kill and destroy. (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 
1999; Bell 1984; Bassiouni 1982; 
Edelman 1988; Crigler 1996; Katz and 
Lazarsfeld 1955; Martin 1985; Podhoretz 
1981; Zaller 1992). Areas of weakness as 
  
well as recent technological 
advancements have served to make the 
terrorist threat much more complex and 
harder to detect and defend. “In the near 
future it will be technologically possible 
to kill thousands, perhaps hundreds of 
thousands, not to mention the toll the 
panic that is likely to ensue may take” 
(Laqueur 1999, 4). The availability of 
weapons of mass destruction also has 
policymakers and defense analysts 
worried. If terrorists gain control of such 
a device, the devastation would be 
catastrophic. These new mediums and 
tools pose a greater threat to society now 
than in the past, largely because of the 
new methods that terrorists now have 
available. While science has allowed for 
great advancements in technology, 
human nature has not changed. Those 
who wish to cause harm now have a new 
frontier upon which to stage, conduct, 
and execute their attacks, thus 





Before analyzing the role of ICTs 
in terrorism, we need to theoretically 
situate our analytical approach.  Research 
on terrorist repertories has pointed at 
terrorist motivations, resources, and 
media attention as leading causes of 
weapon choice (Morris and Hoe 1980 80-
86; Paletz el al.1982; Schaffert 1992). In 
this paper, we also draw from the 
literature of social movements, civil 
conflict and war; notably, Tarrow’s 
(1994) work on political opportunity 
structures. In Power of Movements (1994, 
19), Tarrow points out that political 
action by groups does not just pop out of 
the heads of organizers but is part of what 
he calls a “repertoire of contention” 
which forms a tool kit that a group can 
draw from to try and get its message 
across. Thus, we ask, what ICTs do non-
state terrorist actors have within their 
respective toolkits? And, how do they use 
them?   
 
ICTs and Terrorism 
 
Information communication 
technologies (ICTs), or our use of them, 
as stated, have changed the way we live 
our lives, and their darker side, is 
“altering the nature of conflict across the 
spectrum” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 
1).  The adoption of new ICTs, notably 
Internet appliances (chat rooms, bulletin 
boards, and email) and cell phones, by 
nonstate terrorists is organizationally 
advantageous (Gehrett 2004). With 
geographically dispersed constituents, 
who increasingly are carrying out 
distinct, yet corresponding activities, bi- 
and multidirectional ICTs are able to 
facilitate the quick dissemination of 
information across a decentralized 
terrorist network (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
2001,1: see also Enders and Sanders 
2002). Such ICTs are new additional 
tools within a terrorist group’s repertoire 
that are being utilized to meet the 
organizational needs of decentralized 
networks. In addition, it is important to 
note that, information-age technology can 
help terrorists conduct three broad types 
of offensive information operations (IO). 
First, it can aid them in their perception 
management and propaganda activities. 
Next, such technology can be used to 
attack virtual targets for disruptive 
purposes. Finally, IT can be used to cause 
physical destruction (Zanini and Edwards 
2001, 41). From our interviews, however, 
we find the greatest concern among 
Washington insiders’ centers around the 
organizational functions everyday ICTs, 
such as the Internet, are providing 
  
terrorists. Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s (2001, 
1) concept of “netwar,” even in our post 
9-11 world, is pertinent. It is this subject 
therefore, that dominates our discussion.  
 Succinctly, the importance of 
ICTs today to nonstate terrorists is first 
and foremost their ability to facilitate 
organization, the central tenet of Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt’s (2001) concept of netwar. 
Netwar is a result of the rise of network 
forms of organization, which in turn is 
partly a result of the computerized 
information revolution. To realize its 
potential, a fully interconnected network 
requires a capacity for constant, dense 
information and communication flows, 
more so than do other forms of 
organization (e.g., hierarchies). This 
capacity is afforded by the latest 
information and communication 
technologies- cellular telephones, fax 
machines, electronic mail (email), web 
sites, and computer conferencing 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 10).   
Terrorists are adopting and using 
ICTs for more than the dissemination of 
spoken or written information though. A 
significant component of the 
organizational dynamic within netwar is 
financial (Dickas 2004; Platt 2004). 
Many of binary ones and zeros that have 
interested US intelligence since 9-11 
have centered on electronic funds 
transfers within bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda 
network (Dickas 2004; Gehrett 2004; 
Hutchinson 2004).   
So what makes a nonstate terrorist 
select an ICT? There are a number of 
reasons, but the selection process is, in 
part, based on a particular ICTs cost 
effectiveness. The introduction of new 
technologies in an organization follows a 
complex and often lengthy process. Not 
only do innovative systems have to be 
developed or acquired, but organizational 
actors have to become familiar with new 
systems and be able to use them 
effectively. Given the challenge, terrorist 
groups are likely to channel their scarce 
organizational resources to acquire those 
IT skills that have the greatest leverage 
for the least amount of cost and effort 
(Zanini and Edwards 2001, 50).   
It is not surprising, therefore, that 
terrorists are using readily available 
technologies that are entrenched within 
the fabric of industrial societies. The 
embeddedness of the technologies used 
makes communications, as will be 
discussed later with regard to 
counterterrorism, via them difficult to 
control, although not impossible to 
intercept.  
 Thus, we argue it is useful to see 
the usage of ICTs by terrorist nonstate 
actors, as social constructivism, rather 
than technological determinism. The 
terrorist organization is “neither impacted 
by an external force, nor are they the 
unconscious pawns of cultural Geist. 
Instead of being manipulated, [it] 
manipulates (Fischer 1992, 17). 
Technologies are not repressively foisted 
upon passive populations, any more than 
the power to realize their repressive 
potential is in the hands of a conspiring 
few. They are developed at any one time 
and place in accord with a complex set of 
existing rules or rational procedures, 
institutional histories, technical 
possibilities, and last, but not least, 
popular desires (Penley and Ross, 1991).  
Equally essential, different ICTs 
will be applied for separate goals. As 
Claude Fischer (1992, 7) notes, 
“separable parts of a technological 
system may have separable 
consequences.” Thus, a terrorist may use 
the Internet’s separable parts, such as 
email and chat-rooms, differently to 
achieve different goals. As Zanini and 
Edwards note, Bin-Laden’s “operatives 
  
have used CD-ROM disks to store and 
disseminate information on recruiting, 
bomb-making,” and “Hamas activists in 
the United States use chat rooms to plan 
operations” (Zanini and Edwards 2001, 
37).  In short, different ICTs have 
different uses. 
 Nonstate actors adopt pre-existing 
technologies. They are not involved in 
technological innovation, rather mere 
technological adaptation. The ICTs used 
by terrorists are not the latest 
groundbreaking advances in technology, 
but rather commercial technologies 
which have already been broadly adopted 
in Western societies. Moreover, in 
communication theory terms, the ICTs of 
choice for nonstate terrorists have 
achieved critical mass, which is “when 
about 10-20 percent of the population has 
adopted a news innovation, the 
innovation can be spread to the rest of the 
social system” (Morris & Ogan 1996: 
45).  Recognition of the theory of critical 
mass helps explain further the cost 
effectiveness component of ICTs choice 
by terrorists.   
 Not only are the ICTs adopted 
established technologies in industrial 
states, but these new tools are not 
replacing older, or non-technological, 
tools within a terrorists repertoire of 
contention. Rather, what we conclude is 
while ICTs are facilitators of the day-to-
day organizational networking of a 
group, “electronically mediated 
coordination will not be able to entirely 
supplant face-to-face exchanges” 
between network members. The 
supposed anonymity ICTs, such as chat-
rooms and bulletin boards provide, does 
not allow for trust to be built between 
constituent members. Human face-to-face 
interaction, as the civil society and social 
networks literature indicates, is important 
to foster trust (Harwood and McIntosh 
2004; Kraut et al. 1998; Kraut et al. 
2001). “Human couriers and face-to face 
meetings may still remain essential” for 
terrorists (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 
339).   
The combining of old and new is 
also a product of “communication over 
electronic channels can become a 
liability, since it leaves digital traces” 
(Zanini and Edwards 2001, 39).   
Mistrust, therefore, also centers on the 
level of anonymity new ICTs, such as the 
Internet and cellular phones provide.  
This mistrust is justified since 
“Carnivore’s ability to track Osama bin 
Laden’s email was critical in thwarting 
several of his strikes” (Zanini and 
Edwards 2001, 39). Thus, the adoption of 
technologies by nonstate terrorist actors 
is a complex decision. They are not just 
adopted and adapted because the 
technology is there. “There is no built-in 
demand to innovate” for terrorists.  
Netwar, therefore, as Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt (2001, 339) state, “can be 
waged without necessarily having access 
to the Internet and other advanced 
technologies. This level may mix old and 
new, low-and high-tech capabilities.” 
New technologies, therefore, are not 
necessarily replacing old methods or 
tools within terrorists’ toolbox (Tarrow 
1998).  
 The question for today and 
tomorrow is whether terrorists have the 
desire and opportunity to significantly 
increase their reliance on IT, not for 
organizational means, but to achieve 
disruptive and destructive IO? Is the 
usage of cell-phones as detonation 
devices, as occurred in Madrid last year, 
only the beginning? While a concern 
voiced by several academics, notably 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, from our 
interviews, we find little concern for the 
emergence of newer, more 
  
technologically savvy groups (Gehrett 
2004; Hutchinson 2004; Platt 2004).  
Instead, we find counterterrorism efforts 
focusing on overcoming the 
organizational usage of ICTs, as well as, 
the physical prevention of terrorists into 
the United States.     
 
Countermeasures against Terrorism  
 
Terrorism does not occur in a 
vacuum. Counterterrorism efforts to 
detect, prevent, and/or mitigate damage, 
destruction, or death from a particular 
terrorist repertoire, operate 
simultaneously with terrorism. In the post 
9-11 world, the nonstate terrorist is a 
multi-organizational decentralized 
network that presents structural problems 
for industrial intelligence organizations to 
overcome. Government bureaucracies are 
hierarchical structures that closely guard 
their policy turf. Such structures do not 
serve contemporary counterterrorism 
efforts well. As Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
(2001, 15) note, “[i]t takes networks to 
fight networks.” Decentralized 
bureaucracies, such as the idea behind the 
Department of Homeland Security are 
necessary to more effectively morph 
terrorist group structures.5 Destroying 
terrorist organizations’ organizational 
structure is key to preventing offensive 
attacks, and for keeping America safe. 
Policymaking cannot, therefore, be 
piecemeal since in the past, such efforts 
were ineffective (Enders and Sanders 
1993). In short, counterterrorism must be 
all encompassing, incorporating both 
active and passive policies, and have 
                                                          
5 The idea is only the first step.  Implementation 
is key. We find certain dissatisfaction from 
democrats, for example, Senator Nelson of 
Florida, on the implementation.  “Ah, he 
supported the idea, but has been disappointed by 
the implementation” of the Department of 
Homeland Security (Platt 2004).   
micro- and macro-level strategies, while 
remaining protective of the civil rights of 
citizens (Hutchinson 2004). This is not an 
easy task. 
At the macro-level, the question 
is, how should authorities stop attacks 
using national-level efforts to thwart 
entry of “bad actors” and weaponry? 
Enders & Sandler (1993) and Landes 
(1978) concentrate primarily (but not 
solely) on broad-based countermeasures 
that target no particular repertoire. The 
Department of Homeland Security’s 
strategic plan (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2004, 14) in 
Objectives 2 and 3, speaks to this by 
focusing primarily on efforts to 
“interdict…unlawful migration of people, 
cargo, drugs, and other contraband,” 
protect infrastructure from generic forms 
of attack, and assure broad-based sharing 
of knowledge. These examples of macro-
management serve to provide the 
overarching infrastructure of 
counterterrorism.   
At the micro level, 
countermeasures target a specific terrorist 
repertoire, seeking to develop combatant 
strategies that are both effective and 
feasible. Examples of micro level 
management can be seen with the 
reaction of the United States against the 
terror attacks of September 11. The usage 
of hijacked airplanes to propagate 
terrorism was not a new phenomenon, it 
was how Al Qaeda operatives gained 
control, and further used the airplanes, 
which was the new repertoire. The United 
States responded simultaneously on the 
micro and macro level policies. On the 
macro level, as stated above, was the 
creation on the Department of Homeland 
Security and the establishment of the 
Transportation Security Agency. On the 
micro level, America witnessed the 
installation of advanced screening 
  
equipment and personnel at all airports, 
the commissioning of air marshals, and 
the prohibition of carry on items any of 
which could pose a possible risk. Along 
with such passive policies we also 
witnessed active policies, most notably 
“taking out a lot of terrorist training 
camps in Afghanistan” (Platt 2004). It is 
important, therefore, to recognize both 
levels of strategy have a job to do, 
counteracting individual repertoires on 
the micro level and instituting 
appropriate policy on the macro level.   
Technology undeniably has a role 
to play in counterterrorism. The 
technology is non-traditional, i.e., the 
latest advancements in IT. These devices, 
both active and passive, offer 
unprecedented new capabilities that will, 
it is hoped, save lives and keep 
Americans at home and abroad safer.  
The commitment and role of 
technological advances in the War on 
Terror is evident from the allocations for 
defense spending on R&D in 2005. This 
year such spending will increase by 6.8 
percent or $4.8 billion to another all-time 
high.  
From interviews with members of 
the U.S. government and IT security 
community, the following are 
implemented or forthcoming 
governmentally initiated programs that 
are utilizing information technologies to 
safeguard America.  
 First, is nanotechnology. While 
politicians, with the exception of Asa 
Hutchinson, did not speak to this, Ann 
Gehrett of CACI was particularly 
enthusiastic about the potential 
nanotechnology heralds for 
counterterrorism. Nanotechnology is still 
in the very early stages of its R&D, but 
the basis of nanotechnology revolves 
around the application of science in the 
development of new materials and 
processes through the manipulation of 
molecular and atomic particles.   
Second, there was much 
discussion among both politicians and IT 
security specialists about biometrics. 
Biometric technologies automatically 
authenticate, identify, or verify an 
individual based on physiological or 
behavioral characteristics. This process is 
accomplished by using computer 
technology in a non-invasive way to 
match patterns of live individuals in real 
time against enrolled records. Examples 
include products that recognize faces, 
hands, fingers, signatures, irises, voices, 
and fingerprints.  Biometrics is currently 
being used to enhance computer network 
security, protect financial transactions, 
regulate immigration, and monitor border 
flow (Dornbush 2005). Currently the 
Department of Homeland Security is 
using biometrics in conjunction with 
terrorist watch lists and databases in the 
US-VISIT system. The US-VISIT system 
links databases to provide valuable 
information to port of entry officials and 
consular officials overseas and creates a 
database of pictures and finger scans of 
everyone entering the United States with 
a non-immigrant visa (and soon to 
include visa waiver travelers). This new 
tool means that we have a much better 
idea of who is entering our country. If an 
individual’s finger scan registers a match 
on the terrorist watch list, the Department 
is able to stop them from entering the 
country at the border. Over 200 people 
have already been turned away from our 
borders using this new system (DHS Fact 
Sheet, 2004). The benefits of biometrics 
are not only its ability to be a stand-alone 
safeguard, but it is also well suited to 
work in conjunction with other 
technologies to create a multi-layered 
security infrastructure.  
  
 Third, there was some discussion, 
notably by Asa Hutchinson, Under-
Secretary of Homeland Security, and Ann 
Gehrett of CACI, about BioWatch, which 
is a series of environmental monitors 
located in various cities throughout the 
U.S. These monitors provide an early 
warning of a potential chemical or 
biological attack, allowing for immediate 
countermeasures and treatment. The 
Department of Homeland Security is also 
deploying and evaluating mobile 
automatic air testing kits that house 
biological and chemical sensors allowing 
for instantaneous detection anywhere. As 
well as BioWatch, they discussed 
BioShield which is an aggressive 
campaign that seeks to develop and 
maintain medical vaccines and supplies 
that would be deployed and administered 
in the event of an attack (DHS Fact 
Sheet, 2004). BioWatch coupled with 
Bioshield, they suggested comprising 
safeguard that serves to keep America’s 
cities and their citizens’ safe before, 
during, and after an attack. 
Fourth and while not involving 
advanced technologies on the scale of 
nanotechnology, but equally important to 
a macro/micro-level strategy, is the 
integration of federal and state computer 
databases. Just as hierarchical 
bureaucracies provide a pitfall for 
fighting non-state terrorism, so too does 
federalism. Timely and accurate 
exchange of information between the 
federal, state, and local governments is 
crucial in the prevention, detection, and 
arrest of terrorists and terrorist activities.  
Post September 11, the information 
sharing abilities of U.S. law enforcement 
and intelligence remained poor; “we have 
a lot of problems with information 
sharing, ah, works being done that’s 
redundant, or ah, or works being pursued 
on parallel tracks with no 
communications, we have a lot of 
problems of that nature” (Dickas, 2004).  
It is particularly poor at the local level, 
with both of Florida’s Senators 
spokespersons noting there is a “need for 
more information-sharing” particularly in 
the dissemination of “timely information” 
to local agencies (Dickas 2004: Platt 
2004). “I know the higher up you get, the 
better it gets, but it never gets very good” 
(Platt 2004).   
While Senator Gramm’s 
spokesperson suggests more needs to be 
done, several policies are in the field. The 
recent creation of The Homeland Security 
Information Network, which is available 
in all 50 states, makes threat-related 
information available to law enforcement 
and emergency managers on a daily basis 
through a web-based system (Hutchinson 
2004). In addition, members of 35 
different Federal agencies are now all co-
located together in the DHS’s new 24-
hour Homeland Security Operations 
Center, which allows the information 
coming from various sources to be 
synthesized together and then shared with 
other federal partners such as the FBI and 
the Department of Defense. Furthermore, 
nearly 100 bulletins and other threat 
related dossiers have been sent to 
homeland security professionals across 
the country (DHS Fact Sheet, 2004).   
While no one we interviewed 
spoke to this, it is also important to note 
that integration cross nationally must 
occur also. “There is,” as Enders and 
Sanders (2002) note, “an irony, because 
collective action among terrorist groups 
in sharing training and financing has been 
quite substantial. To date, this suggests 
that terrorists are more united in their 
common goals than are countries in 
addressing the transnational terrorist 
threat.” The lack of discussion of this 
issue may be, in part, a product of the 
  
national-centric definition of terrorism 
used by policymakers (Dickas 2004); 
however, if a macro-level strategy is to 
be effective, a global component must 
feature, particularly in passive policies of 
data and information-sharing.  
 Lastly, several interviewees 
spoke of Operation Liberty Shield. This 
program truly embodies protecting the 
homeland as in conjunction with the 
federal government, many private sector 
companies work to ensure American 
remains safe. Although the two share a 
common goal, the private sector often 
takes a different approach to homeland 
security. CACI is one example of a 
private corporation whose primary 
objective is working with the federal 
government to ensure homeland security. 
Operation Liberty Shield is a program 
that displays this collective action. 
Operation Liberty Shield is a 
“comprehensive national plan designed to 
increase protections for America’s 
citizens and infrastructure while 
maintaining the free flow of goods and 
people across our border with minimal 
disruption to our economy and way of 
life” (CACI, 2005). Operation Liberty 
Shield incorporates various different 
governmental agencies, and is critical in 
the protection of American domestic 
security and surveillance. Anne Gehrett, 
CACI’s vice-president for law 
enforcement programs, particularly 
emphasized throughout the interview the 
importance of this multi-agency 
cooperation, primarily through the 
dissemination of information, and the 
intensive usage of terrorist watch lists 
and databases (Gehrett, 2004).      
 All of these countermeasures, to 
varying degrees involve ICTs, and 
together formulate core components in 
America’s fight against terrorism. While 
these technologies and programs serve to 
keep Americans safer, they are but just 
the initial phase (Hutchinson 2004).  
Much still needs to be done. Great 
emphasis has been placed on the 
homeland since 9/11, however what 
about American interests abroad?  It is 
overseas after all, that Americans are 
most are risk (Enders and Sanders 2002, 
162). The sharing of information amongst 
governments, as we suggest, while a step 
in the right direction, is currently flawed 
since no formal anti-terrorism campaign 
has been established on an international 
scale, thus information sharing between 
international agencies and state actors is 
piecemeal, which will prove ineffective.   
 Today, terrorism is limitless in its 
geographical scope. It fails to adhere to 
recognizable borders, and discerns no 
international set of laws. The two types 
of analysis serve to combat terrorism in 
two very different ways, and their 
application can mean the difference in the 
success or failure of the terrorist act.  
Speaking in terms of macro application 
little can be done legislatively to protect 
the individual. Many of the millions 
spent on macro applications of legislature 
only result in the diminishing of personal 
freedoms, a sort of societal nuisances. 
Micro level application targets individual 
repertoires of the terrorist threat, thereby 
targeting terrorism with a personalized 
strategy. While it is easy to say what 
would work in theory, it must remain 
salient that terrorism will always remain 
a threat to those it seeks to target. In the 
end, the most effective weapon against 
the terrorist threat remains as basic today 
as it will a decade from now; keen 
awareness of any possible threat, 
preparation for any attack, and 
responding immediately to any 






In conclusion, we find two very 
different ICT stories being told. First, 
there is the story of non-state terrorists. 
This is a tale in which traditional ICTs, 
mediums that have achieved critical 
mass, are being used to further, and 
maintain, a group’s decentralized, multi-
organizational, network. Here, ICTs play 
a supporting role, since netwar, at its 
core, is about organization (Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt 2001). The usage of traditional 
ICTs by non-state terrorist actors is to 
facilitate information-sharing and 
knowledge. Furthermore, we find 
traditional ICTs are clearly additional 
tools within the terrorist’s toolbox. The 
adoption of new ICTs, therefore, does not 
replace, by rather supplement, pre-
existing tools, notably face-to-face 
meetings and human couriers. Lastly, we 
find the concerns expressed in several 
academic works of the potential for new 
high-tech terrorists groups (Laqueur 
1999; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001) is not 
voiced by our interviewees whose 
concerns rather center on the 
organizational role ICTs play in terrorism 
today. This disparity of concern among 
academics and practitioners we hope to 
explore in future research.  
Turning to counterterrorism, a 
very different story is told. Here, the 
latest technological advancements are 
being utilized to combat terrorism. 
Biometrics, as Asa Hutchinson (2004) 
noted for example, has allowed for 
unprecedented steps to be taken in the 
protection of key areas of infrastructure, 
thereby limiting potential terrorist targets.  
In addition, the integration of databases 
and watch lists is furthering information 
sharing efforts throughout the federal 
system. From our interviews, it is evident 
that effective counterterrorism will 
continue to incorporate active and passive 
policies at both the micro and macro 
levels.      
While technology will continue to 
advance, human nature will remain 
unchanged. Terrorism has always been 
apart of American history; it didn’t begin 
on September 11, 2001. Combating 
terrorism today is an incredibly salient 
policy issue, with billions spent already, 
and billions more still to come. As John 
Dickas acknowledges, the “threat is 
diminished,” however, much remains to 
be done to ensure a secure America from 
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